Havex, It’s Down With OPC

FireEye recently analyzed the capabilities of a variant of Havex
(referred to by FireEye as “Fertger” or “PEACEPIPE”), the first
publicized malware reported to actively scan OPC servers used for
controlling SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) devices
in critical infrastructure (e.g., water and electric utilities),
energy, and manufacturing sectors.

While Havex itself is a somewhat simple PHP Remote Access Trojan
(RAT) that has been analyzed by other sources, none of these have
covered the scanning functionality that could impact SCADA
devices and other industrial control systems (ICS)
Specifically, this Havex variant targets servers involved in OPC
(Object linking and embedding for Process Control) communication, a
client/server technology widely used in process control systems (for
example, to control water pumps, turbines, tanks, etc.).

Note: ICS is a general term that encompasses SCADA (Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition) systems, DCS (Distributed Control
Systems), and other control system environments. The term SCADA is
well-known to wider audiences, and throughout this article, ICS and
SCADA will be used interchangeably.

Threat actors have leveraged Havex in attacks across the energy
sector for over a year, but the full extent of industries and ICS
systems affected by Havex is unknown. We decided to examine the OPC
scanning component of Havex more closely, to better understand what
happens when it’s executed and the possible implications.

OPC Testing Environment

To conduct a true test of the Havex variant’s functionality, we
constructed an OPC server test environment that fully replicates a
typical OPC server setup (Figure 1
). As shown, ICS or SCADA systems involve
OPC client software that interacts directly with an OPC server, which
works in tandem with the PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) to
control industrial hardware (such as a water pump, turbine, or tank).
FireEye replicated both the hardware and software the OPC server setup
(the components that appear within the dashed line on the right side
of Figure 1).



Havex, It’s Down With OPC

Figure 1: Topology of typical OPC server setup

components of our test environment are robust and comprehensive to
the point that our system could be deployed in an environment to
control actual SCADA devices. We utilized an Arduino Uno
as the primary hardware platform,
acting as the OPC server. The Arduino Uno is an ideal platform for
developing an ICS test environment because of the low power
requirements, a large number of libraries to make programming the
microcontroller easier, serial communication over USB, and cheap
cost. We leveraged the OPC Server and libraries from St4makers
(as shown in Figure 2). This software
is available for free to SCADA engineers to allow them to develop
software to communicate information to and from SCADA devices.


Figure 2: OPC Server Setup

Using the OPC Server
libraries allowed us to make the Arduino Uno act as a true,
functioning OPC SCADA device (Figure 3).


Figure 3: Matrikon OPC Explorer showing Arduino OPC

We also used Matrikon’s OPC Explorer
, which enables browsing between the
Arduino OPC server and the Matrikon embedded simulation OPC server.
In addition, the Explorer can be used to add certain data points to
the SCADA device – in this case, the Arduino device.


Figure 4: Tags identified for OPC server

In the OPC
testing environment, we created tags in order to simulate a true OPC
server functioning. Tags, in relation to ICS devices, are single
data points. For example: temperature, vibration, or fill level.
Tags represent a single value monitored or controlled by the system
at a single point in time.

With our test environment
complete, we executed the malicious Havex “.dll” file and
analyzed how Havex’s OPC scanning module might affect OPC servers it
comes in contact with.


The particular Havex sample we looked at was
a file named PE.dll (6bfc42f7cb1364ef0bfd749776ac6d38). When looking
into the scanning functionality of the particular Havex sample, it
directly scans for OPC servers, both on the server the sample was
submitted on, and laterally, across the entire network.

The scanning process starts when the Havex
downloader calls the runDll export function.  The OPC scanner module
identifies potential OPC servers by using the Windows networking
(WNet) functions.  Through recursive calls to WNetOpenEnum and
WNetEnumResources, the scanner builds a list of all servers that are
globally accessible through Windows networking.  The list of servers
is then checked to determine if any of them host an interface to the
Component Object Models (COM) listed below:




Screen Shot 2014-07-17 at 12.31.56 PM



Figure 5: Relevant COM objects

Once OPC servers are
identified, the following CLSIDs are used to determine the
capabilities of the OPC server:

Screen Shot 2014-07-17 at 12.33.22 PM

            Figure 6: CLSIDs used to determine capabilities of
the OPC server

When executing PE.dll, all of the OPC
server data output is first saved as %TEMP%[random].tmp.dat. The
results of a capability scan of an OPC server is stored in
%TEMP%OPCServer[random].txt. Files are not encrypted or deleted
once the scanning process is complete.

Once the scanning
completes, the log is deleted and the contents are encrypted and
stored into a file named %TEMP%[random].tmp.yls.  The encryption
process uses an RSA public key obtained from the PE resource TYU. 
The RSA key is used to protect a randomly generated 168-bit 3DES key
that is used to encrypt the contents of the log.

resource is BZip2 compressed and XORed with the string “1312312”.  A
decoded configuration for 6BFC42F7CB1364EF0BFD749776AC6D38 is
included in the figure below:

Screen Shot 2014-07-17 at 12.27.24 PM

Figure 7: Sample decoded TYU resource

4409de445240923e05c5fa6fb4204 value is believed to be an RSA key
identifier. The AASp1… value is the Base64 encoded RSA key.

sample encrypted log file (%TEMP%[random].tmp.yls) is below.














00000000  32 39 0a 66 00 66 00 30  00 30 00 66
00 66 00 30 29.f.f.0.0.f.f.000000010  00 30 00 66 00 66 00
30  00 30 00 66 00 66 00 30 .0.f.f.0.0.f.f.000000020  00 30
00 66 00 66 00 30  00 30 00 66 00 66 00 30
.0.f.f.0.0.f.f.000000030  00 30 00 66 00 66 00 30  00 30 00
66 00 37 39 36 .0.f.f.0.0.f.79600000040  0a 31 32 38 0a 96
26 cc  34 93 a5 4a 09 09 17 d3 .128..&.4..J….00000050 
e0 bb 15 90 e8 5d cb 01  c0 33 c1 a4 41 72 5f a5
…..]…3..Ar_.00000060  13 43 69 62 cf a3 80 e3  6f ce 2f
95 d1 38 0f f2 .Cib….o./..8..00000070  56 b1 f9 5e 1d e1
43 92  61 f8 60 1d 06 04 ad f9 V..^..C.a.`…..00000080  66
98 1f eb e9 4c d3 cb  ee 4a 39 75 31 54 b8 02
f….L…J9u1T..00000090  b5 b6 4a 3c e3 77 26 6d  93 b9 66
45 4a 44 f7 a2 ..J<.w&m..fEJD..000000A0  08 6a 22 89 b7 d3 72 d4  1f 8d b6 80 2b d2 99 5d .j"...r.....+..]000000B0  61 87 c1 0c 47 27 6a 61  fc c5 ee 41 a5 ae 89 c3 a...G'ja...A....000000C0  9e 00 54 b9 46 b8 88 72  94 a3 95 c8 8e 5d fe 23 ..T.F..r.....].#000000D0  2d fb 48 85 d5 31 c7 65  f1 c4 47 75 6f 77 03 6b -.H..1.e..Guow.k


–Truncated–Probable Key
Identifierff00ff00ff00ff00ff00ff00ff00fRSA Encrypted 3DES Key5A EB
13 80 FE A6 B9 A9 8A 0F 41…The 3DES key will be the last 24 bytes of
the decrypted result.3DES IV88 72  94 a3 95 c8 8e 5d3DES Encrypted
Logfe 23 2d fb 48 85 d5 31 c7 65 f1…

Figure 8: Sample encrypted .yls file


When executing PE.dll against the Arduino
OPC server, we observe interesting responses within the plaintext



Screen Shot 2014-07-17 at 12.41.27 PM



Figure 9: Sample scan log

The contents of the tmp.dat
file are the results of the scan of the network devices, looking for
OPC servers. These are not the in-depth results of the OPC servers
themselves, and only perform the initial scanning.

particular Havex sample in question also enumerates OPC tags and
fully interrogates the OPC servers identified within
%TEMP%[random].tmp.dat. The particular fields queried are: server
state, tag name, type, access, and id. The contents of a sample
%TEMP%OPCServer[random].txt can be found below:



Screen Shot 2014-07-17 at 12.43.48 PM



Figure 10: Contents of OPCServer[Random].txt OPC

While we don’t have a particular case study
to prove the attacker’s next steps, it is likely after these files
are created and saved, they will be exfiltrated to a command and
control server for further processing.


Part of threat intelligence requires
understanding all parts of a particular threat. This is why we took
a closer look at the OPC functionality of this particular Havex
variant.  We don’t have any case study showcasing why the OPC
modules were included, and this is the first “in the wild” sample
using OPC scanning. It is possible that these attackers could have
used this malware as a testing ground for future utilization,

Since ICS networks typically don’t have a high-level
of visibility into the environment, there are several ways to help
minimize some of the risks associated with a threat like Havex.
First, ICS environments need to have the ability to perform full
packet capture ability. This gives incident responders and engineers
better visibility should an incident occur.

Also, having
mature incident processes for your ICS environment is important.
Being able to have security engineers that also understand ICS
environments during an incident is paramount. Finally, having
trained professionals consistently perform security checks on ICS
environments is helpful. This ensures standard sets of security
protocols and best practices are followed within a highly secure

We hope that this information will further educate
industrial control systems owners and the security community about
how the OPC functionality of this threat works and serves as the
foundation for more investigation. Still, lots of questions remain
about this component of Havex. What is the attack path? Who is
behind it? What is their intention? We’re continuing to track this
specific threat and will provide further updates as this new tactic


We would like to thank Josh Homan for
his help and support.

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